Masood Masjoody
[redacted]

Court of Appeal for British Columbia
400-800 Smithe St
Vancouver, BC, V6Z2C5

RE: Judgement 2022 BCCA 135;
CA47689 Masood Masjoody v Amélie TROTIGNON; Simon Fraser University

The Honourable Chief Justice of British Columbia,

I have let the Registry know that it would be inappropriate to disclose this letter, to any of the following adjudicators before it is duly delivered to the Honourable Chief Justice of BC:
- Justices *Marchand*, *Fisher*, *Fitch*, and *Abrioux*;
- Registrar *Outerbridge*

I would like to let you know about the Division of the Court completely neglecting one of the two orders sought by this appeal. I would like to seek your direction on rectifying this bizarre situation now that the Division has published a judgment that failed to address an appealed order.

(I will also address some other misconducts which are, at best, on the verge of betraying the public trust in the justice system, including crafting instant rules from the bench to achieve a predetermined outcome, effectively helping cover up for institutional supporters of the terrorist regime of the Islamic Republic and depriving me of my own rights to justice after the respondent institution invaded my private life.)

Outstanding matters following the judgment of the Court (including half of the appeal)

The sought order that the Division failed to address in its decision aimed to overturn the lower court's decision (by Fitzpatrick J.) that put Fitzpatrick J. seized of any application about this matter in the court below. The Division also ADMITTEDLY disregarded most of the appellant's arguments, which are often in support of both orders sought by this appeal.

I would appreciate it if you could provide directions on how to revive the appellant's fundamental legal rights when the Court of Appeal has failed to deliver its one and only duty, which is to hear and decide the issues on appeals.

****

In the rest of this letter, I will briefly address some other alarming facts and issues about the Division's decision:

1 - Obscure (anti-)Law Making from the Bench: The Court Incentivizes Conspiracy

I would also like to bring to your attention the very alarming fact that the Division crafted a new "test" (inconsistent with the existing laws) only to evade a proper analysis of the conspiracy cause of action in this matter, while such analysis would have undoubtedly resulted in the appeal being allowed.

Due to the nature of the conspiracy as occurred (interfering in the appellant's personal life) and the defendants' refusal to release any of the demanded documents, an appellate court did not have lawful standing in disallowing the appeal. Therefore, an outcome-driven court would have had to depart from upholding the statutory and common laws and craft a new "law" toward a specific goal. Of course, that approach would go beyond the scope of one single case and affect the legal rights of all future litigants of conspiracy actions.

The Division essentially "argues" that if a court can somehow attach a motive to a conspiracy that the court says is related to an employment relationship, then the Court must decline jurisdiction regardless of the conspiracy as occurred, whereby protect the conspirators. According to this "test", it does not matter what the conspiracy was and how it was materialized.

This ruling clearly incentivizes conspiracy, particularly by governmental institutions and other powerful public bodies:

From now on and relying on the Division's "ruling", powerful public bodies can comfortably engage in the criminal act of conspiracy through any unlawful act they are capable of and be sure that the courts of BC are now bound to be at their service by hindering the rule of law unless it is the Rule of the Jungle.

Hence, even if a conspiracy is carried out by burning down the victim's dwellings or even arranging to murder him, the courts must not care. Based on the newly crafted legal artifice, the courts in BC are now legally bound to come to the rescue of some conspiring murderers by depriving the victims of their legal right to life.

In its very first implementation, this obscure approach came to the rescue of a terrorist regime's supporter at Simon Fraser University, while the said supporter engaged in a retaliatory invasion of someone's personal life and relationships.

Yes, Mr. Chief Justice: This is how low the Division has gone to support and protect the SFU administration (a fellow wealthy and powerful public body).

It is astonishing that this pseudo-legal artifice has been crafted in the 21st century by the high Court of British Columbia with all its constitutional (including Charter) obligations, not by omnipotent medieval rulers or the modern era judicial puppets of "*remarkable*" and "*larger than life*" "*leaders*" such as Stalin and, of course, Castro.

However, I note that two of the three judges in the Division are appointees of PM Justin Trudeau, whose Justice Ministry has unapologetically stood in the way of, and harassed, the justice-seeking families of victims of the deliberate shootdown of Flight PS752 by the Islamic Republic, and has sided in Canadian courts with the criminal leaders of the Islamic Republic and the chiefs of the terrorist entity, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

2 - A Judge Lying in the face of evidence and the prior words of the judge himself

Mr. Marchand dishonestly expressed in the judgment that the words of Corporate Defamation (which in fact (1) are yet to be disclosed to the appellant by the conspirators and (2) constitute part of the conspiracy cause of action) are the repetition of the defamatory words by the individual respondent, as constitute the defamation cause of action.

Even more dishonestly, Mr. Marchand pretended that this was the appellant's submission!

Mr. Marchand included these obvious lies not only in the face of all my pleadings and appeal material but also despite the fact that Mr. Marchand himself, in the one and only time he asked me questions during the hearing of the appeal, proceeded to confirm with me the diagonally opposite of his later lies. As it appears, at that time, he may have only wanted to ascertain and identify the necessity of later manipulations in his judgment for hiding the Division's intention to "reach" the predetermined decision of protecting SFU supporters of the terrorist regime of the Islamic Republic.

On top of these lies, Mr. Marchand indeed argued—as mentioned above—that in the determination of jurisdiction over conspiracy, the Court was not even required to know what the conspiracy was (whether it be defamation, sexual harassment, murder, assassination, or any other criminal act), let alone what the words of the conspiratorial defamation were.

3 - Bias and the extensive dealings of the counsels with the courts

Of the three opposing counsels, two of which appeared in this appeal,

- Yun Li-Reilly was hired by the Court in 2016, and, ever since, she has worked for the Court, and closely so with several judges and Mr. Outerbridge
- Robert B. Kennedy started to activate corrupt links within the courts as of August 2020
- Claire Hunter, a close relative of Justice Hunter and the head of Hunter Litigation Chambers founded by Hunter J., has extensive dealings with the Court and Registrar Outerbridge

To realize how the Court dealt with these facts (which together with supporting evidence were before the Court in affidavits, and were never opposed), one can consider how distortedly and falsely the Court reflected on them, for instance, in paras 8-9 of Mr. Abrioux's judgment of Feb 24, 2022.

Notably, Mr. Outerbridge has been an adjudicator in these appeal proceedings and, even following the disclosure of these facts to the Court, continued to be closely involved in handling the judges' opinions and obtaining the final judgment in favour of the SFU supporters of the terrorist regime of the Islamic Republic.

4 - Defamation (non-conspiratorial)

With this level of craftiness combined with bold dishonesty in the face of facts and evidence, one should not expect an honest application of existing laws to stand-alone defamation (a different cause of action than conspiracy). This can be confirmed upon reviewing the Division's, apparently outcome-driven, "analysis" of the defamation cause of action (paras 35-47).

****

I look forward to hearing from you soon, particularly on obtaining a complete decision on my appeal, prior to the imminent taking of the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada.

For ease of reference, I am appending a summary background and the issues on appeal.

Yours sincerely,

Masood Masjoody
May 13, 2022

[Background— Following the disclosure of SFU's political, scientific, and technical support for the terrorist regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, SFU commenced a conspiracy campaign against the appellant, Masood Masjoody, by the way of sexual harassment and defamation, both regarding the appellant's personal life and relationship with the individual respondent.

The appellant commenced an action in the court below against the respondents for defamation and conspiracy.

The court below decided to evade the hearing of the action by claiming a lack of jurisdiction. In the same decision, Fitzpatrick J. of the court below exhibited obvious signs of bias and—presumably, to please and entertain the wealthy and politically powerful SFU administration and their governmental supporters by her written judgment— she inhumanly engaged in mockery of the pleadings. She further ordered that she would be seized of any application relating to the action she had dismissed.

Issues on appeal

The appellant brought two issues on appeal, seeking to:

(1) overturn the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; and
(2) overturn the decision of Fitzpatrick who decided that she would be seized of any further application and hearing relating to the action in the court below.

The Court was provided with several independent arguments supporting the appeal.

The Division's obscure approach

While the sole existential philosophy of a court of "appeal" is to consider the issues on appeal and arguments by the appellants—three judges comprising a division of the Court annually receive more than $1.2M to honestly discharge this unique duty—the eventual judgment:

(1) Completely failed to address one of the two orders sought (50% of the appeal); and
(2) Admittedly ignored the majority of the arguments in support of the other order sought, which arguments were often also supportive of the ignored part of the appeal

Further to that, the Division deliberately lied about the facts of the case and further decorated such lies ironically by attributing them to the appellant, particularly about defamation as a part of the conspiracy (Corporate Defamation) and another defamation as a stand-alone cause of action (Trotignon Defamation).

While the (undisclosed) words of Corporate Defamation were provenly circulated within the SFU administration, such words have not been disclosed to the appellant or the courts. However, Marchant J. falsely pretends otherwise by claiming that the appellant says that Corporate Defamation was the repetition of the stand-alone defamation. Mr. Marchant lies in the face of evidence, despite the fact that the appellant's pleadings in both courts and factum clearly plead the opposite.

Even more troubling is that Mr. Marchand himself confirmed the latter with the appellant during the hearing of the appeal.

The Division did not stop there because the existing laws do not seem to support the end of dismissing the appeal regarding the conspiracy. On top of that, the lies and fabrications would not help dispose of the sexual harassment part of the conspiracy. Therefore, their outcome-driven approach required one more step, which turned out to be new law-making from the bench. They provided a totally absurd line of "reasoning" around the motive in the conspiracy. They attached a certain motive to the conspiracy of SFU, and put in writing that it is the motive to a conspiracy that exclusively determines the jurisdiction of the courts; how the conspiracy was carried out is immaterial, and the infringements of the individual rights of a litigant in the context of the litigant's personal life may not be litigated. Consequently, based on the new “law,” even a plaintiff who has been the subject of a conspiracy to murder may not sue the conspirators in court, depending on the courts determination of the motive for murder.**]**